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Abstract 
The landmark decision of Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority was a victory 
for advocates of adolescent autonomy. It established a test by which the court could 
measure children’s competence with a view to them authorising medical treatment. 
However, application of the test by clinicians reveals a number of ambiguities which 
are compounded by subsequent interpretation of Gillick in the law courts. What must 
be understood by minors in order for them to be deemed competent? At what point 
in the consent process should competence be assessed? Does competence confer 
on minors the authority to refuse as well as to accept medical treatment?  These are 
questions which vex clinicians, minors and their families. Growing numbers of 
commentators favour application of parts of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to minors. 
In this article, the limitations of this approach are exposed and more radical reform is 
proposed.  
Introduction 
Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authorityi was a landmark decision,ii crystallising a 
new legal approach recognising minors as independent rights holders. The House of 
Lords held that competent minors under the age of 16 (referred to in this article as 
‘minors’) could seek contraceptive advice and treatment in their own right. Lord 
Scarman held that a competent minor will have ‘sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed’.iii Gillick 
promised to make competent minors ‘small scale sovereigns’.iv It ostensibly gave 
them authority to make certain decisions. However the scope of the authority lacked 
clarity, enabling its limitation in subsequent cases.  
                                            
i
 [1986] AC 112. 
ii
 J Fortin, ‘The Gillick decision - not just a high water mark’, in S Gilmore J. Herring and R Probert 
(eds), Landmark Cases in Family Law, (Oxford: Hart Publications, 2011). 
iii
 [1986] AC 112, [253]. 
iv
 HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982), 183. 
As we shall see, problems with Gillick stem from both inherent limitations (it was 
designed to respond to a specific issue but has been applied in much wider contexts) 
and its subsequent judicial interpretation, particularly in a series of cases restricting 
the powers of competent minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment (collectively 
referred to in this article as the ‘refusals cases’). These problems have existed for 
some time, but are increasingly pertinent as children’s autonomy rights gain 
mounting recognition at both judicial and political levels. This article brings to the 
debate new emphasis on the problematic application of the test in clinical practice, 
which has been the focus of a recent research projectv and a novel proposal for 
reform.   
The paper begins by setting out the ambiguities inherent in the current interpretation 
of Gillick. It is argued that the test is an inadequate tool for adjudicating the balancing 
exercise which clinicians and judges are sometimes called upon to perform between 
protecting minors’ welfare by preserving life and healthvi and taking into 
consideration minors’ views and giving them due weight.vii  Turning to potential 
solutions, emphasis is placed on a recent Court of Appeal decision in which it was 
recognised that adults who have capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA) may nevertheless lack capacity at common law.viii McFarlane LJ was careful 
to formulate the common law test in line with the facilitative approach of the MCA. An 
extension of the same principle to minors might enable the law to adopt a universal 
approach to capacity whilst simultaneously ensuring that the welfare of minors is 
protected. If so, it may (at least in the field of competence to make medical treatment 
decisions) be time to say ‘Goodbye’ to Gillick.   
Capacity and competence 
At the outset, it is useful to put the Gillick competence test (which applies to under 16 
year olds) in context. The law in England and Wales relating to two other age groups 
is worthy of comparison. The capacity of adults (over 18s) is governed by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (and its accompanying Code of Practice), which provides a 
scheme to protect those who are unable to make decisions. Mental capacity is quite 
distinct from child competence.ix Under the MCA, not only is capacity assumed,x but 
‘[a] person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success’.xi The MCA test for 
capacity has a narrower scope than the Gillick competence test. Section 2(1) of the 
                                            
v
 [Ref removed to maintain anonymity] 
vi
 Protected by virtue of Children Act 1989, s. 1(1).  
vii
 For example, first on the ‘welfare checklist’ in the Children Act 1989, s. 1(3) is the court’s 
requirement to take into account the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child (considered in the 
light of his age and understanding). This applies in relation to care proceedings and opposed 
applications for s. 8 orders. 
viii
 DL v A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253. 
ix
 Her Honour Nasreen Pearce, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005: Not the Children Act for grown ups’ [2011] 
July Family Law 697. 
x
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(2). 
xi
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(3). 
MCA defines a person lacking capacity as someone, who is, on the balance of 
probabilities,  
… unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain … 
on the basis that he cannot understand, retain, use or communicate his decision 
(section 3).  
Much of the MCA also applies to 16 and 17 year olds. In addition, the ability of 16/17 
year olds to consent to medical treatment is governed by section 8 of the Family Law 
Reform Act 1969. Consequently, 16/17 year olds are presumed both to be 
competent and to have capacity, but both presumptions are rebuttable. Where 16/17 
year olds lack competence their guardian or the court will make decisions which 
prioritise the minors’ welfare.xii Where 16/17 year olds lack capacity, the MCA sets 
down a framework designed to ensure that decisions are taken on their behalf, in 
their best interests.xiii There is overlap between the schemes but there are also 
points of departure. For example, a 16 year old who cannot make a decision 
because he lacks maturity is likely to have MCA capacity but lack competence under 
the Family Law Reform Act.  
Gillick and treatment refusals 
The Gillick competence test responded to the public policy requirement that some 
minors under the age of 16 should be able to access contraceptive treatment without 
necessarily having to involve their parents. The application of the test in this context 
was confirmed post Human Rights Act 1998 in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for 
Health.xiv The Gillick test, like much of the common law, has developed in an ad hoc 
manner. As the test has been applied and interpreted in increasingly wider contexts 
(both medical and non-medicalxv), it has shown signs of strain.  
This is particularly evident in a series of cases involving minors who elected to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment. Interpretation of the Gillick competence test in these cases 
led to much academic condemnation.xvi Arguably the cases counter the emphasis on 
autonomy which is implied in Gillickxvii and preserved in the Children Act 1989.xviii 
Two separate grounds were developed for overriding a minor’s treatment refusal. In 
Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment)xix and Re W (A Minor) 
                                            
xii
 Children Act 1989, s. 1. 
xiii
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 4. 
xiv
 [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin). 
xv
 See for example Re Roddy (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2927 
(Fam); Mabon v Mabon [2005] EWCA Civ 634. 
xvi
 Neatly summarised in S Gilmore and J Herring, ’No’ is the hardest word: consent and children’s 
autonomy (2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly 3, p 4. 
xvii
 [1986] AC 112, [186] per Lord Scarman: ‘[the] parental right yields to  the child’s right to make his 
own decisions when he reaches a sufficient  understanding and maturity’. 
xviii
 J Murphy, ‘W(h)ither adolescent autonomy?’ (1992) 14(6) Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 529, 531. 
xix
 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, [1992] 1 FLR 190, 
[1991] 4 All ER 177. 
(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction)xx it was stated (obiter dicta) that a 
competent decision to refuse treatment could be overridden provided another valid 
source of consent could be found. One potential source is parental consent, and this 
aspect of the law may be subject to challenge,xxi but I have dealt with this related 
question elsewhere.xxii My focus here is with another potential source of consent: the 
court’s power to veto the minor’s decision. Lord Donaldson stated:  
 
[The court has the] right and, in appropriate cases, duty to override the decision 
of the parents or other guardians.  If it can override such consents, as it 
undoubtedly can, I see no reason why it would not be able, and in an appropriate 
case, willing, to override decisions by ‘Gillick competent’ children ...xxiii  
Similar reasoning was applied in Re W in relation to minors aged 16/17, who are 
presumed competent to consent.   
Alternative reasoning was developed in cases including Re L (Medical Treatment: 
Gillick Competency)xxiv and Re E (A Minor)xxv, where incompetence (rather than a 
judicial veto of competent decisions) was cited to justify the overriding of each 
minor’s refusal.  However, the ambiguous definition of competence enabled judges 
to raise the threshold to arguably unattainable levels.xxvi  
In both types of case, there is a lack of clarity as to the appropriate timing of the 
assessment of competence and the method of assessment. In addition, the value of 
competence – the authority it confers on the minor – is contentious because it was 
not made clear why minority status renders a competent decision subject to veto. It 
is to these three ambiguities that we now turn. 
The trouble with Gillick 
Timing of the assessment 
Section 3 of the MCA requires, that capacity is, in part, a question of actually 
understanding the information relevant to the decision. On the basis of the dicta of 
Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser and the interpretation of Gillick in the refusals cases, 
there is doubt as to whether this is required of the Gillick competent minor. 
According to the House of Lords, a competent minor is one who has the capability to 
understand. ‘Capability’ refers to the minor having the ability to understand which, in 
turn, will depend on the complexities of the particular decision. As Mostyn J 
                                            
xx
 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, [1993] 1 FLR 1. 
xxi
 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment, 2
nd
 ed (2009), 
Ch 3, para 15. 
xxii
 E Cave, ‘Adolescent consent and confidentiality in the UK’ (2009) 16(4) European Journal of 
Healthcare Law 309. 
xxiii
 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, [25] per Lord 
Donaldson MR. 
xxiv
 [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
xxv
 (1990) 9 BMLR 1. 
xxvi
 M Brazier and C Bridge, ‘Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent Autonomy’ (1996) 16 Legal 
Studies 84. 
recognised in D Borough Council v AB: ‘The terms of [Gillick] show clearly that the 
capacity in question is act and not person specific.’xxvii However, if capability to 
understand rather than actual understanding is required in order for a minor to be 
recognised as competent, then the assessment might legitimately be made before 
the minor has made a decision. Lord Scarman stated that a minor is competent 
‘when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of 
making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision.’xxviii Lord Fraser said: 
Provided the patient, whether a boy or a girl, is capable of understanding what 
is proposed, and of expressing his or her own wishes, I see no good reason for 
holding that he or she lacks the capacity to express them validly and effectively 
and to authorise the medical man to make the examination or give the 
treatment which he advises.xxix  
Capability to act autonomously is different from acting autonomously. If the Law 
Lords had been concerned solely with the latter, they would presumably have made 
reference to ‘whether a boy or girl understands …’ rather than ‘whether a boy or girl 
is capable of understanding’.  
There are sound reasons for capability forming part of the competence test. First it 
reflects the legal presumption that minors under the age of 16 lack competence. It is 
the duty of clinicians to establish how much information to give them and in what 
form, by assessing their capability. If, instead, the test required an assessment of 
minors’ actual understanding of the information, then the law would require full 
disclosure to all children, which has the potential to cause harm. Second, the 
emphasis on capability protects the physician who assesses the minor to be Gillick 
competent, provides the information and the treatment and finds subsequently that 
the minor did not fully understand it, from a claim in battery.  By way of comparison, 
under the MCA, capability to understand is relevant to the assessment of capacity. A 
person (‘with an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or 
brain’) will lack capacity if they have an inability to understand the relevant 
information.xxx The inability might be proved by incapability to understand or by a 
failure to actually understand.  Reliance on the former is limited by a requirement to 
take all reasonable steps to help the person decide.xxxi 
If Gillick competence has been interpreted to relate purely to capability to decide 
(which, as shall be shown in the next section, is one potential interpretation of the 
subsequent case law), then this creates a tension between the application of the test 
in court and in practice. In the latter, as we shall see, the dynamic process of 
consent requires a consideration of both capability to understand and actual 
understanding.  
                                            
xxvii
 [2011] EWHC 101 (COP), [18]. 
xxviii
 [1986] AC 112, [186]. My italics. 
xxix
 [1986] AC 112, [169]. My italics. 
xxx
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 3. 
xxxi
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(3). 
Treatment / refusal distinction 
It may be that reliance on competence as capability is in part responsible for the 
distinction which has emerged post-Gillick between consent and refusal. Two 
interpretations of the competence test are possible. On the first interpretation, 
competence is assessed as capability, so a minor capable of consenting but unable 
to understand or communicate a decision to refuse treatment might nevertheless be 
labelled ‘competent’, requiring the court to overrule the ‘competent’ decision in order 
to protect the minor’s welfare. On the second interpretation, competence is assessed 
as both capability and actual understanding in which case the assessment might 
incorporate the minor’s ability to choose between having and not having the 
treatment. On this interpretation, the court retains the power to consent if the minor 
refuses and treatment is in his best interests. Either interpretation is possible on the 
basis of Re Wxxxii which concerned the refusal of treatment by a 16 year old (who, it 
will be recalled, is presumed competent to consent to treatment under section 8(1) of 
the Family Law Reform Act 1969). Lord Donaldson did not decide one way or 
another:  
 No question of "Gillick competence" in common law terms arises. The 16- or 
17-year-old is conclusively presumed to be "Gillick competent" or, alternatively, 
the test of "Gillick competence" is bypassed and has no relevance.xxxiii  
Section 8(3) of the Family Law Reform Act,xxxiv which preserves existing law, was 
held to have the effect that parents and the court retain the ability to consent 
alongside minors. Lord Balcombe stated: 
The purpose of [section 8] is clear: it is to enable a 16-year-old to consent to 
medical treatment which, in the absence of consent by the child or its parents, 
would constitute a trespass to the person. In other words, for this purpose, 
and for this purpose only, a minor was to be treated as if it were an adult.xxxv  
Some have interpreted this to mean that section 8(1) applies only to consent and not 
to refusalxxxvi in which case the presumption of competence only applies to decisions 
to consent. Provided the presumption of competence is not rebutted, 16/17 year olds 
can consent but do not necessarily have the power to refuse treatment. If this is so, 
the competence relating to consent and competence relating to refusal must be 
assessed separately because a presumption of competence applies to one and not 
the other.  
On the second interpretation, it could be inferred from Re W that competence applies 
to the decision rather than separately to consent and refusal. Lord Balcombe 
                                            
xxxii
 [1993] Fam 64. 
xxxiii
 [1993] Fam 64, [77] per Lord Donaldson MR. 
xxxiv
 FLRA 1969, s. 8(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any consent 
which would have been effective if this section had not been enacted. 
xxxv
 [1993] Fam 64, [86]. 
xxxvi
 A McFarlane, ‘Mental capacity: one standard for all ages’ [2011] 41 Fam Law 479, p 484, ‘…the 
provision in FLRA 1969, s 8 relates only to giving rather than refusing consent… ‘. 
recognised that ‘In logic there can be no difference between an ability to consent to 
treatment and an ability to refuse treatment.’xxxvii This interpretation is more readily 
applicable to clinical consent where competence is frequently assessed on the basis 
of the individual’s ability to choose between options.xxxviii For example, if a minor with 
an abscess is asked to choose between antibiotics and minor surgery, the clinician 
will want to ensure that the minor understands the alternatives in relation to each 
other. Similarly, when a minor chooses between radiotherapy and palliative care, the 
clinician is interested in the minor’s ability to decide between the two rather than to 
understand each in isolation. On this interpretation, both capability and actual 
understanding are relevant. The presumption of competence applies to the decision 
and thus to both consent and refusal.  
Ambiguity surrounding this issue leads to a potential distinction between treatment 
and refusal and potentially to assessment taking place before a decision is reached 
so that competence to assent requires the court to overrule refusals rather than 
assess the minor’s competence to decide between having and not having the 
treatment. 
Defining Competence 
In terms of defining competence, it is apparent from the previous section that there is 
dissention regarding what must be understood in order for a minor to be viewed 
competent. In addition, there is uncertainty surrounding the required level of 
understanding. Lord Scarman requires the minor to ‘understand fully what is 
proposed’.xxxix Lord Fraser sets out what this entails in the context of contraceptive 
advice,xl  but in other contexts the required level of understanding will necessarily 
differ.  Similarly, ‘maturity’ has proved difficult to define. It might incorporate physical, 
psychological, emotional, cognitive, and / or social maturity. Undeniably childhood 
has a biological component but how this is construed is based on the social 
construction of childhood.xli Whilst it is necessary that the test is flexible enough to 
adapt to a wider variety of contexts, too much flexibility enables those assessing 
competence to focus less on the minor’s functional ability to make the decision and 
more on the outcome of the decision.  In some cases, because the outcome of the 
minor’s decision would be so serious, it is difficult to see how the minor could prove 
competence.xlii  
                                            
xxxvii
 [1993] Fam 64, [88]. 
xxxviii
 E Cave and J Wallbank, ‘Minors’ capacity to refuse treatment: A reply to Gilmore and Herring’ 
(2012) 20(3) Medical Law Review 423. 
xxxix
 [1986] AC 112, [253]. 
xl
 [1986] AC 112, [189D].  
xli
 A Prout and A James, ‘A new paradigm for the sociology of childhood?’ In A James and A Prout 
(eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood : Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of 
Childhood  (London: Routledge/Falmer, 1990), pp 7-33. 
xlii
 Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency)  [1998] 2 FLR 810.  
The authority conferred by virtue of competence 
A third ambiguity concerns the relationship between competence and authority. For 
adults, the law on consent is gradually metamorphosing from a legal tool designed to 
transfer responsibility (and so defend doctors from a claim in battery) to a means of 
protecting patient autonomy.xliii The concept of Gillick competence and its 
subsequent judicial interpretation acts as a barrier to the same process occurring in 
relation to child consent. Being competent only enables minors to authorise 
decisions which relevant others determine to be in their best interests. This position 
has potential to conflict with minors’ rights.  
Minors’ moral rights are notoriously difficult to define. Baroness O’Neill has 
expressed doubt that ‘rights’ are necessarily the best way to protect children, 
preferring instead to articulate the relevant obligations of adults.xliv Expressing 
demands as rights claims when the group is made up of such a diverse range of 
individuals is challenging. Feinberg recognises that some rights belong only to 
adults, some are shared by adults and children and some belong to children only.xlv 
In its present form, the Gillick competence test is unhelpful in determining whether 
and in what circumstances minors have the same rights as adults or should be 
subjected to protections by virtue of the vulnerabilities inherent in youth. 
In terms of legal rights, in England and Wales all people (including children) are 
protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 which gives effect to the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950. Children’s rights to make decisions about their 
treatment have traditionally been stymied by a ‘Bolamite philosophy’.xlvi In Bolam,xlvii 
the court laid down a test for establishing the standard of care in relation to skilled 
professionals. A doctor was not to be found negligent if a responsible body of 
medical opinion would view the practice as proper. As a result the scope for external 
assessment of the clinical judgment was considerably reduced.xlviii Likewise, in 
relation to the treatment of minors, Brazier and Miola recognise that: 
The ‘reasonable doctor’ determines whether or not to override the 
adolescent’s refusal of treatment, regardless of whether or not the young 
person is Gillick competent. ... [The refusals cases] grant the power to decide 
disputes about the treatment of a minor to the medical profession.xlix 
                                            
xliii
 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41. 
xliv
 O O’Neill ‘Children’s rights and children’s lives’ (1998) 98 Ethics 445. 
xlv
 J Feinberg, ‘A Child's Right to an Open Future’, in W Aiken and H LaFollette (ed), Whose Child? 
Parental Rights, Parental Authority and State Power, (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), pp 
124–153. 
xlvi
 M Brazier and J Miola, ‘Bye-bye Bolam: A medical litigation revolution?’ (2000) 8 Medical Law 
Review 85, p 94. 
xlvii
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
xlviii
 H Teff, ‘The standard of care in medical negligence: Moving on from Bolam?’ (1998) 18(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 473. 
xlix
 M Brazier and J Miola, above n xlvi, p 94. 
The effect is that ‘human rights are squeezed out of health care law’.l Brazier and 
Miola argue that the decision in Bolitholi signalled an intention to return Bolam to its 
proper limits and began a gradual reversal of this trend. However, the Gillick test (as 
subsequently interpreted) remains stubbornly resistant to change.  
Arguably, developments in human rights jurisprudence require greater weight to be 
attributed to minors’ autonomy rights. Not all agree. Adjudicating the potential conflict 
between rights focused on welfare and autonomy goes to the very heart of the 
debate on child consent.lii Minors are not the only ones who can be subjected to 
compulsory treatment in their medical interests, regardless of their competent 
refusal. For example, under the Mental Health Act 1983, an adult may have the 
requisite mental capacity to make a treatment decision, but lack the right to refuse 
treatment.liii In both cases, this position may be compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, at least where the treatment prolongs life. Article 8(1) 
of the Conventionliv has been interpreted to protect autonomy rights, including the 
rights of minorslv  but it is subject to Article 8(2) for the protection of health and must 
be balanced with the positive obligation in Article 2 to preserve life.lvi 
Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 prioritises the welfare of the child. The Act 
gives effect to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), 
ratified by the UK in 1991. The treaty does not form part of our law but has markedly 
increased in relevance in recent years. This is evidenced in the dicta of Silber J in R 
(Axon) v Secretary of State for Health;lvii legislation in Wales,lviii and in recent 
recommendations by the Children and Young People’s Health Outcomes Forum that 
the NHS Constitution be revised to so as to be applicable to children, young people 
and their families and that the Department of Health produce a Children’s Health 
Charter based on the UNCRC.lix The UK recently became a signatory to the Council 
of Europe Declaration on child friendly health care which recognises ‘children’s rights 
as a guiding principle in the planning, delivery and monitoring of health care services 
                                            
l
 Ibid., 95. 
li
 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771. 
lii
 S Choudhry and H Fenwick, ‘Taking the rights of parents and children seriously: Confronting the 
welfare principle under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 253. 
liii
 Mental Health Act 1983, s. 83: … consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical 
treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering, not being a form of 
treatment to which sections 57, 58 or 58A applies, if the treatment if given by or under the direction of 
the responsible medical officer. 
liv
 Article 8(1): Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
lv
 R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin); Mabon v Mabon [2005] EWCA 
Civ 634. 
lvi
 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p 113. See also E Cave, ‘Adolescent consent and confidentiality in the UK’ (2009) 16(4) 
European Journal of Healthcare Law 309.  
lvii
 [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), [79]. 
lviii
 Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011. 
lix
  I Lewis and C Lenehan (Co-Chairs), Report of the Children and Young People’s Health Outcomes 
Forum (July 2012). 
for children’.lx The UNCRC incorporates participatory rights (the right of a child ‘who 
is capable of forming his or her own views … to express those views freely ...’ and 
assurance that the views will be ‘… given due weight in accordance with  … age and 
maturity’ (Article 12) and rights to protection (including the right to ‘primary 
consideration’ of children’s ‘best interests’ (Article 3) and a ‘right to life’ (Article 6)). 
Whilst there is potential conflict between Articles 3lxi and 12(1),lxii Eekelaar has 
demonstrated that they are not diametrically opposed.lxiii Arguably the interests of 
minors are served by overriding their immediate decision where a failure to do so 
would prevent them from developing into functionally autonomous agents. Thus 
there are strong arguments for applying future-orientated versions of autonomy in 
cases where the decision would result in death or serious injury. Adults are not 
protected in this way, but perhaps they ought to be. Some feel that an objective 
measure of rationality should be applied, regardless of the age of the patient.lxiv  
On the other hand, the risk inherent in this position is that capacity is defined in 
relation to the outcome of the decision rather than the autonomous quality of the 
decision. The MCA takes a functional approach to capacitylxv and recognition of 
minors as independent rights holders has led to pressure to move from a protective 
to an empowering position on welfare. This is discernable in the jurisprudence of 
both domestic courtslxvi and the Europe Court of Human Rights.lxvii Looking beyond 
the arena of refusals of treatment, the courts are increasingly willing to defer to 
minors who are capable of participating in or defining their own best interests. For 
example, in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health,lxviii Silber J played down the 
significance of Nielsen v Denmarklxix (which promoted parental powers to consent to 
treatment beneficial to their child) and demonstrated the dwindling rights of parents 
as their children mature. In Mabon, Thorpe LJ stated that the law must ‘reflect the 
                                            
lx
 9th Council of Europe Conference of Health Ministers, Child-Friendly Healthcare: Building a Health 
Future for and with Children (2011 Lisbon).  
lxi
 Article 3(1): In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
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(1994) 8 International Journal of Law and the Family 42. 
lxiv
 J Savulescu and RW Momeyer, ‘Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs?’ (1997) 23 
Journal of Medical Ethics 282. 
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 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 2(3). 
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extent to which, in the 21st century, there is a keener appreciation of the autonomy 
of the child’.lxx  
More generally, there is a rights-based paradigm shift in approach to the denial of 
legal capacity to those capable of its achievement.lxxi This is true in relation to both 
minors and other vulnerable groups.lxxii Charitable paternalism is gradually being 
supplemented by rights-facilitation - alongside the duty to measure capacity is an 
emerging duty to facilitate and develop capacity. This developing ethos is difficult to 
reconcile with Gillick. The distinction between competence and authority is becoming 
increasingly tenuous. We have seen that the Gillick test has led to minors being 
labelled incompetent when they are capable of making an autonomous decision and 
competent when they lack the functional capacity to decide.  
It is be possible to protect welfare without reliance on the court’s inherent jurisdiction 
to veto competent decisions. A New South Wales Law Commission draft Billlxxiii 
defines competencelxxiv and recommends that: 
 … [A] competent young person may accept or refuse health care and it is not 
necessary to obtain an acceptance or refusal of the health care from the 
young person’s parent or other legal guardian.lxxv  
 
In Scotland, the age of majority is 16 and the right to consent to and (pending a test 
case) to refuse medical treatmentlxxvi arguably applies from that time.lxxvii By adopting 
a specific and robust test for competence, minors are protected from making 
decisions which are not autonomous.  
This does not deny the necessity to satisfy Articles 3 of the UNCRC which makes the 
best interests of the minor a primary consideration. The application of the welfare 
principle does not of itself require that the court has the power to veto competent 
decisions. Provided the test for competence is clear and will correctly identify those 
who lack functional capacity in relation to the particular decision, it should be 
possible to protect welfare (at least on a rights-based account) by virtue of a 
facilitative rather than an authoritarian approach. If this is so then, as we shall see, 
intervention under the parens patriae aspect of the inherent jurisdiction could be 
limited to decisions on behalf of those who are shown to lack capacity. 
                                            
lxx
 [2005] EWCA Civ 634, [26]. 
lxxi
 See, for example, Commissioner for Human Rights, Who Gets to Decide? Rights to Legal Capacity 
for Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities (Strasbourg, 2012) CommDH/IssuePaper 
(2012)2. 
lxxii
 See, for example, National Disability Rights Network, Devaluing People with Disabilities:  Medical 
Procedures that Violate Civil Rights (May 2012). 
lxxiii
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission. 2008. Young People and Consent to Healthcare. Rpt. 
119. 
lxxiv




 S Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge Cavendish, 2007), p 112. 
lxxvii
 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s. 2(4). 
Competence in practice 
Prior to exploring potential solutions, this section considers ways in which the legal 
ambiguities impact upon clinical practice. As part of the Medical Practitioners, 
Adolescents and Informed Consent project, we have held a series of multidisciplinary 
workshops focusing on the impact of the law on adolescent consent in practice. We 
have debated the current ambiguities in adolescent consent and alternatives for 
reform. The common law develops in response to cases which come before the 
court rather than by reference to clinicians’ need for a comprehensive framework. 
Furthermore, the test has evolved with application by judges rather than doctors in 
mind. There are subtle differences in the way the test operates in the different 
arenas. For example, the court assesses competence in relation to a specific issue 
at a given time. Clinicians operate in a more volatile environment, where a minor’s 
competence can change over time and in relation to different decisions. Underlying 
the differences in approach are the diverse functions of informed consent. The court 
traditionally focused on legal consent, which is designed to transfer responsibility. lxxviii 
Clinical consent, on the other hand, aims to facilitate treatment by fostering co-
operation, enabling decision-making, preventing harm and doing good.   
As was highlighted in the previous section, it is apparent that, when the concept of 
Gillick competence is applied by clinicians, the ambiguities surrounding the 
assessment of competence, its timing and value can be accentuated. As we have 
seen, in addition to making things difficult for clinicians, the uncertainties have 
potential to pose significant barriers to the protection of children’s rights. 
Three additional effects of legal ambiguity on clinical practice are worthy of further 
explanation. Firstly, and most obviously the ambiguities highlighted in the previous 
section create uncertainty amongst doctors, minors and their families about the 
relevance of competence and when and how it should be assessed. The GMC,lxxix 
Department of Healthlxxx and British Medical Associationlxxxi provide invaluable advice 
but are stymied by ambiguous and contradictory law. Gillick has been applied in New 
Zealand and Australia. There, the practical problems have been articulated more 
fully than is the case here. This is in part a result of the academic furore over the 
refusals cases in England and Wales. By comparison, Gillick has been referred to as 
the golden age of adolescent consent.lxxxii In countries which do not have the 
unfavourable comparison of subsequent legal development against which to contrast 
the Gillick decision, there is a more candid appreciation of its inherent defects, 
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particularly in relation to its application in clinical practice. In the words of a 
commentator from New Zealand:  
The English House of Lords decision in Gillick has dominated the issue of 
minor capacity to consent for the last 25 years, but the decision has raised 
more issues and ambiguities than it hoped to solve.lxxxiii  
A New South Wales Law Reform Commission has drafted a Billlxxxiv building on 
Gillick on the basis that:  
… the ambiguities in the common law are important enough to warrant closer 
attention and to be clarified in legislation. … these ambiguities do not 
generally reflect simple technical uncertainties in the operation of the law, but 
relate to more substantive questions about the decision-making processes for 
young people’s health care. Attempts at clarification should not be left to the 
necessarily ad hoc developments of the common law but should be based on 
considered policies…lxxxv 
In Australia, some states rely on Gillick but others have legislated to resolve the 
confusions. A recent survey found that in Queensland (which relies on Gillick), there 
was considerable variation in the responses from practitioners to a questionnaire 
asking how they would deal with a minor who sought to make a contentious medical 
decision.lxxxvi In England and Wales too, there is evidence that practitioners find the 
law confusing and incoherent.lxxxvii The uncertainty also affects minors and their 
parents.lxxxviii This potentially acts as a barrier to the participation of minors in medical 
treatment decisions which Article 12 of the UNCRC require to be ‘given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child’.lxxxix   
The second practical implication of the ambiguity surrounding Gillick competence is 
that uncertainty regarding the definition and value of competence has implications in 
respect to other aspects of a minor’s treatment. For example, it affects the minor’s 
right to information (for example where a parent insists that information is withheld 
from a minor) and confidentialityxc (for example where a minor requests that his 
decision to refuse treatment is kept from his parents). 
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Thirdly, the very potential for court authorisation of treatment a competent minor 
refuses, significantly affects consent in practice. Where the minor is effectively told 
‘consent or we’ll get the court’s permission to treat you’, the minor’s agreement is a 
mere promise of co-operation, rather than a voluntary and informed consent.xci This 
significantly limits the role relevant minors can play in the decision making process. 
As Alderson and Montgomery state, ‘[p]articipation can be worse than useless when 
used as a pretence of consultation, or to disguise the fact that no real choice is being 
given.’xcii Clinicians are not necessarily doing anything wrong when they use the 
potential for court authorisation as leverage. The potential exists because the law 
has said that it should.  A distinction can be drawn between a threat and a 
prediction.xciii ‘Nudging’ patients to do what is right for them (whether as a matter of 
policy, morality or law) is a soft form of paternalism which has recently received 
considerable support.xciv The legal prominence of best interests, combined with the 
jurisdiction of the court to veto a minor’s competent decision, legitimises medical 
predictions of court authorisation where the minor refuses to cooperate.  
On the other hand, reductions in freedom and voluntariness affect the value of 
consent to the minor. As Baroness O’Neill recognises: ‘Where free and informed 
consent is given, agents will have a measure of protection against coercion and 
deception.’ xcv To discourage the use of predictions of court authorisations to 
persuade competent minors to accept treatment, the inherent jurisdiction would need 
to be limited so that competent refusals are honoured. The mode of leverage would 
have to be removed. In order to achieve this, a new method of protecting welfare 
would be needed. In the next section such a method will be proposed.  
Solutions 
A solution is needed which is relevant, applicable and which appropriately balances 
children’s rights to participation and protection in both legal and clinical contexts. In 
this section, a number of potential solutions are rejected on the basis that they would 
fail to achieve these goals. An alternative solution is put forward.  
The limitations of common law clarification  
Ambiguities in the test for Gillick competence might be addressed through common 
law clarification. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 2009 that the application of 
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the best interests test to a 14 year old competent minor refusing a life sustaining 
blood transfusion for religious reasons did not breach her rights.xcvi Abella J held that 
‘a thorough assessment of maturity, however difficult, is required in determining his 
or her best interests’xcvii and that: 
… in some cases, courts will inevitably be so convinced of a child’s maturity 
that the principles of welfare and autonomy will collapse altogether and the 
child’s wishes will become the controlling factor.xcviii  
The Canadian Supreme Court moved beyond the position taken in Re R and Re W 
that minors’ views are of mere consultative value (in contrast to the views of 
competent adults which are authoritative).xcix It moved closer to Archard and 
Skivenes’ view that though the minors’ views may not be authoritative, they are 
always relevant, because Article 12 of the UNCRC demands that all children are 
consulted about decisions made about them.c  
In England and Wales then, a subtle change in emphasis might place the best 
interests test more squarely within a rights-based agenda by enhancing the 
relevance of minors’ views.ci This would make it most unlikely that a competent 
decision would be vetoed. The court would seek evidence of a minor’s view and 
assess maturity and understanding. However, there are two flaws in this approach. 
First, reducing reliance on the best interests test by labelling more minors 
incompetent is objectionable if some of those minors are in fact maximally 
autonomous. Second, this option would have minimal impact in clinical practice. In 
relation to the second issue, this is not to say that doctors are not interested in the 
views of minors, just that the relevance would remain focused on ensuring their 
cooperation and making treatment feasible, rather than the question of whether or 
not to accept their autonomous decisions. Arguably, as long as the best interests test 
applies (regardless of competence), clinicians will focus on clinical rather than 
emotional and psychological interests.  Clinicians might argue, like Abella J, that 
some minors are so competent that their best interests are served by accepting their 
view, but in doing so, clinicians would face a risk which judges avoid – namely, that 
the patient or his next friend might later challenge the clinician’s assessment of best 
interests.  If minors are deemed vulnerable by virtue of minority (rather than 
competence) then they might claim that they should be protected from decisions 
which limit the length or quality of their lives. Take, by way of example, a minor 
whose refusal of a lung transplant at the age of 13 is respected and at 15 she finds 
that she is no longer eligible for transplant and will be dead within a year. Might the 
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minor complain that doctors should have done more to persuade or even compel her 
to have surgery? Section 5 of the MCA protects doctors acting in good faith but this 
does not extend to doctors treating a Gillick competent minor. Consequently, whilst a 
rights-based perception of best interests might limit the incidences of minors’ 
competent decisions being overridden in court, the paternalistic test is likely to 
continue to facilitate more subtle forms of compulsion in practice.  
The court might reduce reliance on the best interests test further still if it can rely on 
a robust conception of competence. Some commentatorscii have suggested that this 
might be achieved through reliance on parts of the MCA. As we have seen, the MCA 
does not currently apply to minors under the age of 16.ciii They are required to prove 
their competence and subjected to a different test. Brazier and Bridge argued that in 
the treatment refusals cases of Re R and Re W: ‘The notion of Gillick competence in 
particular as applied to minors was fundamentally flawed.’civ This resulted in ‘judges 
apparently overruling ‘competent’ choices which analysis shows to be in no real 
sense autonomous’.cv They suggested that the functional test for understanding – 
the second part of the test for capacity now laid down in the MCA –offers a superior 
test.  
In an article in the Family Law Journal, Andrew McFarlane, appointed Lord Justice of 
Appeal in 2011, suggests that the MCA scheme for evaluating capacity is likely to be 
applied to ‘otherwise Gillick competent’cvi children who come before the High Court 
having refused medical treatment, so as to effect a refined definition of competence 
‘in place of the blunter instruments of ‘age’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘understanding’’.cvii This 
would make for a more robust definition of competence and, because the threshold 
is set high, give judges scope to veto harmful decisions on the basis of 
incompetence, rather than vetoing a competent decision because it is in the minor’s 
best interests. According to McFarlane, this interpretation would effect ‘a move from 
paternalistic and protectionist approach to a rights based evaluation of each child as 
an individual against the context of the facts in a particular case’cviii which is surely to 
be welcomed. However, whilst this approach might lead to greater judicial respect for 
minors’ autonomous decisions, such a result is by no means inevitable, as is 
demonstrated by McFarlane’s example: 
By way of example, in the case of an adult who refuses to consent to a life 
saving blood transfusion the Court of Protection, on the current case law, is 
likely to override that refusal on the ground that the patient lacks capacity to 
refuse consent at that time.cix  
                                            
cii
 A McFarlane, above n xxxvi; and see V Chico and L Hagger, above n cxxiii. 
ciii
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(5). 
civ
 M Brazier and C Bridge, above n xxvi, p 85 and p 91. 
cv
 Ibid, p 109. 
cvi
 A McFarlane, above n xxxvi, p 484. 
cvii
 Ibid, p 485. 
cviii
 Ibid, p 484. 
cix
 Ibid, p 484. 
For the COP to come to this conclusion, the adult in this scenario would need to be 
shown to be unable to make a decision for himself due to a lack of capacity. The Act 
makes clear that: ‘A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely 
because he makes an unwise decision’ (Section 1(4)). Consequently it is far from 
clear that the Court would routinely protect adults in this manner. The scope to 
override minors’ decisions, however, would be much more extensive.  
The rights-based evaluation, to which McFarlane refers (and which the MCA extends 
to adults), would be subject to considerable dilution when applied to minors. First, 
McFarlane does not envisage the presumption of capacity applying to minors.cx The 
presumption operates in relation to adults to prevent decisions being overruled on 
the basis of lack of understanding alone, which might be demonstrated by virtue of 
the fact that the decision is contrary to the person’s best interests. It is this feature 
which effectively renders the best interests test inapplicable unless incapacity is 
demonstrated.  
Second, in relation to adults, the high level of understanding required by section 3(1) 
(incorporating not only understanding but also retaining, using, weighing or 
communicating the decision) is balanced by virtue of the fact that it will only come 
into question if section 2(1) is satisfied, namely that the patient has ‘an impairment 
of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’. If, unlike adults, minors 
bear the burden of proof of capacity, then the same high threshold which serves to 
protect adults from being labelled as lacking capacity, makes it all the harder for 
minors to prove capacity. If the result of applying the MCA test to minors is that they 
would find it impossible to demonstrate their capacity to refuse life sustaining 
treatment, then McFarlane’s suggested change in approach would have minimal 
impact on the protections of their human rights.  Furthermore, the high level of 
understanding required in the MCA could have negative implications for minors’ 
rights to consent. Assuming that the MCA test would not be reserved for cases 
where the court adjudicates refusalscxi and should also be applied in clinical practice, 
the implication of fewer minors being considered competent to refuse treatment, is 
that fewer will be able to consent.cxii 
Thus, incorporating aspects of the MCA into Gillick competence would be 
problematic. The MCA is designed to empower and protect the autonomy rights of 
adults. Cherry-picking the scheme for evaluating capacity and rejecting those 
provisions designed to protect adults from an outcome-based capacity test is a 
limited victory for children’s rights even if it does enable the court to rely on the 
combined doctrines of competence and capacity rather than best interests to justify 
their overruling minors’ decisions.  
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One test for all 
Hagger and Chico suggest that an opportunity was missed in not applying the MCA 
to minors: 
If we adopt the position that children’s rights are important, we should allow 
those children who are capable of demonstrating instrumental rationality … to 
make their own decisions whether they want to forgo their future autonomy in 
favour of their present autonomy.cxiii  
They argue that mature minors should be able to prioritise their current desire 
autonomy in the same way as competent adults. This is a proposition which has 
been shown to be effective in Ontario, Canada, where a single test for and 
presumption of capacity applies to all. A competent minor can consent to and refuse 
medical treatment and neither parents nor the court have a power of veto. In Ontario, 
the Health Care Consent Act 1996 presumes capacitycxiv defined in section 4(1): 
A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or 
a personal assistance service if the person is able to understand the 
information that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, 
admission or personal assistance service, as the case may be, and able to 
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of 
decision. 
Capacity is time specific,cxv applied regardless of age and is accompanied by a duty 
to take steps to help the person achieve the necessary understanding.cxvi However, 
unlike the MCA, the Health Care Consent Act definition of capacity is based entirely 
on a functional test, without additionally requiring proof of mental impairment. As a 
result, minors who are overwhelmed, immature or subject to undue influence are 
likely to be considered to lack the required mental capacity to make a decision. They 
would be protected by virtue of application of the best interest test. In England and 
Wales, the same minors would be unlikely to be caught within the terms of the MCA, 
in which case they would be deemed capable of consenting. Clearly this would be 
unworkable for very young children and would subject older ones to considerable 
danger. As a result, the MCA could not be extended to apply to minors without 
concurrent reform of the test for capacity. This would be problematic. Not only does it 
raise definitional quandaries, but universal application of the revised test would have 
the effect of limiting the protections afforded by the Act to those over the age of 16. 
The absence of a requirement of maturity, freedom from undue influence and life 
experience from the MCA is quite deliberate. It is intended to ensure that capacity is 
based on a functional rather than an outcome based test.  
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At this point, it would seem that the MCA is an unsuitable mechanism to protect 
under 16 year olds. We have seen that partial application of the MCA is problematic 
because it would insufficiently protect minors’ autonomy interests; full application 
would fail to protect their welfare interests; and altering the terms of the Act to extend 
the definition of incapacity to incorporate inexperience, immaturity and undue 
influence would limit the effectiveness of the Act in protecting adults.  
Concurrent tests for capacity 
One way forward would be to apply the MCA test for capacity to minors alongside 
another test for incapacity which is specifically designed to encapsulate those factors 
which render some young people functionally incapacitated. As we have seen, the 
law takes this approach to protect 16/17 year olds. The MCA applies in conjunction 
with the Family Law Reform Act 1969. Pre-MCA, the Law Commissioncxvii advised 
that this safeguard was necessary so that immature minors (who may have MCA 
capacity) would be protected by the best interests test where the presumption of 
competence is rebutted. One possibility would be to extend the dual application of 
competence and capacity which applies to 16/17 year olds, to younger minors. 
However, this would fail to tackle the inherent problems with Gillick competence 
which have been highlighted in this paper. An alternative would be abandon Gillick 
and develop a new test which can apply conjointly with the MCA. The first question 
this raises is whether this is possible, the second is whether it would be desirable. 
We will take each in turn. 
Pre-MCA, the High Court operated an inherent jurisdiction to protect vulnerable 
people who lacked capacity to consent. There has since been uncertainty as to 
whether it survives the MCA.cxviii Dual application of the statutory and common law 
tests is contentious. One of the protections the MCA offers is preventing people who 
satisfy the test for capacity from being labelled ‘incapacitated’ and thus being robbed 
of the opportunity to make a decision for themselves. Arguably the Act is intended to 
be exhaustive. On the other hand, conferring legal capacity on those whose 
decisions are not autonomous may inadequately protect their welfare. The law was 
recently clarified in A Local Authority v DL.cxix  In DL the Local Authority had 
evidence that DL was physically and verbally controlling his elderly parents. 
McFarlane LJ (whose insightful article was referred to earlier in the paper) confirmed 
that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction survives the MCA. The Court of Appeal 
recognised that the parents had MCA capacity, but due to DL’s undue influence, it 
was held that they lacked capacity at common law. There is no express provision in 
the MCA limiting the inherent jurisdiction and it was felt that the MCA alone was 
insufficient to protect vulnerable adults.  
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The jurisdiction has potential to apply beyond cases of undue influence. In SA 
(Vulnerable adult with capacity: Marriage)cxx (which was heard prior to the MCA 
coming into force), Munby J recognised that the inherent jurisdiction acts as a wide 
safety net;  
The inherent jurisdiction is not confined to those who are vulnerable adults, 
however that expression is understood, nor is a vulnerable adult amenable as 
such to the jurisdiction. The significance in this context of the concept of a 
vulnerable adult is pragmatic and evidential ...cxxi 
In DL, McFarlane LJ supported this wide definition.cxxii In SA, Munby J recognised 
that ‘the jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults ... is for all practical purposes 
indistinguishable from its well-established parens patriae or wardship jurisdictions in 
relation to children...’cxxiii  If the MCA were to apply to all regardless of age, the 
common law might limit and adapt its inherent jurisdiction in relation to minors in an 
extension of the approach taken in DL. Minors would be presumed to have capacity 
under the MCA, and at common law. The MCA would protect minors whose 
incapacity results from ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the 
mind or brain’. The common law could develop principles which prevent minors 
having the power to make decisions which are in no way autonomous.  
Developing the ambits of a more limited inherent jurisdiction by which the capacity of 
minors could be assessed at common law, would have two distinct advantages over 
continued use of the Gillick competence test. First, it has potential to operate as part 
of a single test for all which would improve consistency and reduce confusion 
amongst patients and doctors. Second, by mirroring the facilitative approach adopted 
in the MCA, it might operate in a manner which is more conducive to protecting 
children’s rights. In DL, McFarlane LJ was careful to limit the ambits of the 
jurisdiction and to tie the development of the common law to the MCA principles. As 
Theis J recognised in the High Court, the jurisdiction will apply in relation to ‘persons 
who are deemed not to have capacity in the true sense, and not [to] persons where 
paternalistic authority considers the act unwise’.cxxiv Thus, the duty complements the 
law on consent which recognises that consent must be ‘real’. It is not intended to 
overrule those who make autonomous decisions, but to recognise the reality that the 
MCA definition of capacity does not necessarily encapsulate all autonomous 
decisions or label as incapacitous all decisions which are not autonomous.cxxv The 
inherent jurisdiction relies on close correlation with the MCA to achieve compatibility 
with Article 8. In determining the extent of the application of the inherent jurisdiction 
the court would consider whether the ruling is necessary and proportionate. 
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Interference with autonomy would only occur where it is justifiable to protect health 
or to promote autonomous decision making free of undue influence. cxxvi  
Conclusion  
A number of problems with Gillick competence have been articulated.  Some of 
these have existed for a long time but their effects in clinical practice have been 
under researched. The problems are rendered acute by virtue of a paradigm shift in 
relation to autonomy and its relationship with legal capacity.cxxvii Those assessing 
capacity are increasingly recognised to have a parallel duty to facilitate, empower 
and develop capacity.cxxviii Aspects of the decisions of Re R and Re W contradict this 
approach. This article has explored ways in which their worst effects might be 
bypassed if a case comes before the court, but in clinical practice their legacy serves 
as a barrier to the recognition and protection of children’s autonomy rights. It has 
been argued that a robust test for capacity might potentially be utilised as a 
mechanism to protect the best interests of minors without recourse to the court’s 
powers to veto competent decisions and that the Gillick competence test fails in this 
regard.  
The MCA provides a definition of capacity which is significantly more developed and 
comprehensive than Gillick competence. The test is not perfect. It links informed 
consent to individual autonomy, and a growing body of literature questions critiques 
this approach.cxxix On the other hand, the MCA promotes the enhancement of 
decisional autonomy, respect for decisions which are functionally autonomous and 
respect for the views of those whose lack of capacity renders the best interests test 
relevant to decisions about their care. It does not preclude a relational model of 
clinical consent, and incorporation of minors within its remit would not prevent them 
involving or deferring to their family and carers. The biggest challenge, however, is 
that the MCA is ill-suited to serving the minor’s, the state’s and parents’ interests in 
protecting minors from harm. This article has explored suggestions by some 
commentators that parts of the MCA could be used to supplement Gillick 
competence. This approach would enable the court to overrule minors on the basis 
of their incapacity rather than overruling their competent decisions and it would give 
clinicians a more robust framework for defining capacity. It is a realistic and welcome 
way forward if a test case comes before the court. On the other hand it has 
limitations. It does little to improve the link between autonomy and the authority to 
make decisions. The test for capacity for minors would be likely to be heavily 
dependent on the outcome of the decision - something which the Act seeks to 
prevent in relation to adults. In clinical consent, it would not prevent the use of 
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leverage which has potential to water down attempts to improve the participatory 
rights of children in the healthcare arena.  
It has been suggested in this article that legislation might incorporate minors within 
the MCA in conjunction with a new common law test for child incapacity. Any minor 
with ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ which 
leads to an inability to understand would be subject to the best interests test. Minors 
whose consent is rendered involuntary due to undue influence could, post DL, be 
subject to the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. By extension, the High Court could, 
in light of modern empirical evidence of children’s abilitiescxxx and the MCA principles 
(such as the duty to maximise capacity), set down a revised test for child incapacity. 
Like the Gillick test this would leave gaps. However the gaps would be less 
extensive due to the presumption of capacity and the relevance of the MCA. 
Professional bodies, such as the General Medical Council, would be able to develop 
guidance which embraces the MCA principles and reflects recent jurisprudence on 
children’s rights. By embracing one concept of capacity for all, the law would operate 
in a manner which is more coherent, consistent and comprehendible both to those 
applying and those subject to it. Andrew McFarlane wrote of the importance of 
effecting ‘a move from paternalistic and protectionist approach to a rights based 
evaluation of each child as an individual against the context of the facts in a 
particular case’.cxxxi Whilst acceptance of the arguments put forward in his Lordship’s 
2011 article would go some way towards achieving this goal, it is respectfully 
submitted that his Court of Appeal decision a year later represents an opportunity to 
truly embrace this philosophy and effect meaningful progress in the protection of 
children’s healthcare rights. 
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